Introduction
There is an on-going debate about whether or not the human situation is improving or becoming more unstable as population growth and economic development continue in most areas of the world. A current example of this debate is the discussion that has been generated by Lomborg's this debate that a comprehensive forecast was undertaken and critically reviewed almost concurrently. As most of the debate has focused on the future only limited attention has been given to systematic appraisals of past forecasts. Yet systematic appraisals of past forecasts are critical though both in terms of assessing the validity of the arguments of both sides but also to provide an indication of how useful and accurate current predictions relating to the global environment and human well-being are likely to be.
The debate between the Cornucopians and neo-Malthusians has progressed over time, with the focus shifting from a debate largely about the adequacy of natural resources for meeting human needs to a focus on the ability of the biosphere to cope with growing human impacts. Global 2000 captured the early stages of this shift by examining each of its resource predictions in terms of the likely effect on the environment, with this environmental analysis taking up almost half of the section on future predictions. Unfortunately, however, much of this environmental analysis largely repeated what was said in the earlier chapters of the report. The Resourceful Earth, being a multi-edited book, varied considerably in the focus of each chapter. As a whole, it was, as its name suggests, focused upon resource issues but it did deal with ecological and environmental consequences of increased resource use, and the chapters on long-run trends in environmental quality, and air and water quality both focused almost entirely upon environmental quality trends rather than resources adequacy. It should be noted from the start that there are serious methodological difficulties associated with long term forecasts, including problems relating to the data upon which the predictions are based, problems of scale, of aggregation, and of assumptions about the linearity of ecological and socio-economic processes. Being clear about the methodological difficulties of forecasts is important when making predictions, but to some scientists, any long term forecast, whatever its direction is rendered virtually useless by such difficulties. Nonetheless, forecasts continue to be made and their validity discussed.
In preparing this paper careful attention was paid to ensure that similar or compatible data sources were used for the year 2000 to those data used by Global 2000 and The Resourceful
Earth. Thus where possible, data from the same (or equivalent) US government agency or international organization was used for comparison, at times supplemented with data or information from the general scientific literature where appropriate. Despite, this, data definitions have varied over time and by source, particularly with resources such as forests. In such cases where compatibility is doubtful, it can be more appropriate to look how rates of exploitation or growth have changed compared to predictions in order to avoid being misled by absolute figures.
The Global 2000 Report to the President and The Resourceful Earth: An overview
Global 2000 largely based its trend projections that were used to form its conclusions on the long-term data and models developed by the US government federal agencies. Because the models of the different federal agencies were not designed to be used in an interactive manner, interaction between the models was limited to developing projections sequentially. Population and Gross National Product (GNP) projections were used to estimate demand in the resource sectors, and all of these projections were then used to prepare the environment projections [10] .
While this sequential process allowed limited interaction among the elements of the study, continuous interaction and feedbacks between the models employed was not possible. It was possible, however, for the different agencies involved to comment upon the results prepared from other agencies and this feedback to be incorporated back into the modeling process.
Global 2000 begins its major findings and conclusions chapter by stating that:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead.
Despite greater material output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.
For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will be worse.
Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now -unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.
[10] (p1 of Volume 1)
Global 2000 went on in subsequent paragraphs to outline in greater detail what global conditions would be like in the year 2000. Specifically, it said that there would be continuing rapid population growth, slightly lower in percentage terms but greater in absolute numbers than in 1975 [10] . Economic growth would continue in most countries, but at the same time, in most less developed countries Gross National Product (GNP) per capita would remain very low.
While food production was projected to increase on a per capita basis, most of that increase was predicted to go to countries with relatively high per capita consumption, while per capita consumption in many less developed regions of the world was expected to scarcely improve or even decline. Real food prices were expected to double. Global oil production was predicted to peak in the 1990s. While richer industrialized nations were expected to be able to cope with the associated energy price increases that were expected, many less developed nations were predicted to have increasing difficulties meeting their energy needs, and for the quarter of the human population dependent on wood for fuel, the outlook was seen as being bleak.
On a slightly more positive note, Global 2000 suggested that non-fuel mineral resources were sufficient to meet demands through to the year 2000, although disproportionate use by industrialized countries would continue [10] . However, regional water shortages were expected to worsen, global deforestation would continue at an alarming rate, as would plant and animal extinctions and agricultural land degradation. Radioactive and other hazardous materials would present increasing health and safety problems in a growing number of countries.
Despite such serious problems, Global 2000 did conclude that the situation was not hopeless since the study's projections were based on the assumption that relevant national policies and programs would remain essentially unchanged through to the year 2000, even though policies were already beginning to change [10] . Such changes, so far however, were not seen as being adequate, with the report saying that a period of unprecedented co-operation and commitment between nations was essential. Without prompt and vigorous changes in public policy around the world, Global 2000 suggested that the world's problems would become unmanageable, with any delay likely to seriously reduce options for effective action.
In The Resourceful Earth no attempt was made to reach an agreed upon synthesis of all chapters. There is no formal conclusion or summary chapter of key findings. However, in the introduction a broad outline and summary is given. To highlight the difference between the two reports in the clearest possible terms, the first two paragraphs of Global 2000, as quoted above, were reworded in this introduction in the light of what was presented in the subsequent pages of
The Resourceful Earth:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be less crowded (though more populated), less polluted, more stable ecologically, and less vulnerable to resource-supply disruption than the world we live in now. Stresses involving population, resources, and environment will be less in the future than now… The world's people will be richer in most ways than they are today… The outlook for food and other necessities of life will be better… life for most of the people on earth will be less precarious economically than it is now.
[9] ( p1-2: italics and shortenings in original) Simon and Kahn [9] went on to state that the then present global trends in life expectancy, birth rates, food supply, deforestation, and availability of oil and mineral resources were generally improving rather than worsening, while problems relating to matters such as climate change, water scarcity and species loss were much less significant than was frequently suggested. They argued that although all was not necessarily well then nor would everything necessarily be well in the future, global trends which indicated that things were generally improving rather than deteriorating could be expected to continue in the future as humans, both individually and collectively, continued to address the problems they face.
Perhaps the most important point of divergence between the two works is in their assumptions regarding the endogeniety of policy responses. Global 2000 qualifies its findings with an assumption that current polices will continue. In contrast, Simon and Kahn [30] argue that throughout history individuals and communities have always responded and adapted to changes in their environment and so basing predictions on past trends implies that this adaptation will continue and hence policies will be modified. In The Resourceful Earth, each of the major conclusions of Global 2000 is challenged by showing either that the statement itself is meaningless because it is too vague or value laden, that there is no evidence to back up the claim, or that global trends clearly imply the opposite.
Did Global 2000's projections materialize ?
As noted in the introduction to The Resourceful Earth, much of the language used in the introduction to Global 2000 was vague at key points, making it difficult to evaluate in a quantifiable way [9] . To assess the accuracy of Global 2000, the projections specified within it 
Population projections:
In Global 2000 high, medium and low population projections were given with the high and low projections "representing the highest and lowest population counts that may reasonably be expected to occur" and the medium representing "reasonable" projections [10] . World population was predicted to increase from around 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 billion in 2000, an increase of more than fifty percent. 5 The high medium and low population projections for the world and a select range of countries are given in Table 2 . This contention can only be tested by looking at the other subjects dealt with in Global 2000.
Food and agricultural projections
Global 2000 included three scenarios in its projections for the food and agricultural situation of the world in 2000. Alternative 1 was the base line projection, while alternatives 2 and 3
represented the upper optimistic and lower pessimistic bounds of their projections in terms of population and income growth rates. While all the scenarios painted for developed countries were relatively optimistic, with more than adequate food supplies continuing, even in the optimistic projection for less developed countries in per capita food consumption suggested that gains were likely to be small and unevenly distributed. In the pessimistic projection per capita levels were not projected to grow at all [10] .
The Global 2000 report does not state clearly how food production was defined and thus it is difficult to ensure that any comparison with the present is entirely consistent. Nonetheless, the production is shown in Table 3 .
{table 3 about here} Table 3 shows that the overall food production projections in Global 2000 were relatively accurate, but at the same time, they were spectacularly incorrect for some individual countries or regions. Production in the former Soviet Union was less than half the projection, while that of China was more than twice the projection. Given the significant proportion of the human population which is concentrated in China, China's unexpectedly good performance is very significant to the world's overall food situation. The inability to accurately predict the food situation in these two countries perhaps highlights the importance of effective social systems and adaptive capacity relative to the basic natural resources endowment and population size.
Reality was considerably better than implied by overall food production. Not only was total food production slightly higher than predicted by Global 2000 but given that population growth was slower than predicted (that is, the medium projection which was considered the most likely) global per capita food production was much higher than expected.
Global 2000 also prepared two scenarios of daily per capita calorie consumption (tables 6-8, 6-9 and 13-17 of report). Scenario A assumed that the real price of energy would remain constant, low population growth, high income growth, and favorable weather would occur. Scenario B assumed that the real price of energy would increase, there would be high population growth, low income growth and less favorable weather. 6 In Figure 1 Johnson [13] noted that there had been modest improvements in per capita food supplies in low income countries in the previous three decades and that real prices of major foods had been
declining. An increasing rate of growth of per capita food production in developing countries was thought to be likely. International trade in grain had grown rapidly during the 1970s and a world food system had developed which had substantially reduced the risks of food shortages, famine, and hunger resulting from natural disasters, with most people in the world being expected to be able to participate in this system by the end of the century [13] .
The analysis presented in The Resourceful Earth showed that despite considerable variability over the short term, real price trends of most major agricultural commodities had declined over the previous century due largely to rising productivity [13] . Johnson [13] [14] . However, global food prices are heavily affected by agricultural subsidies, meaning that ascertaining whether the real cost of producing food is increasing or decreasing over time is very difficult, even if these figures do show a dramatic decline in prices and thus suggest falling costs.
In the environmental section of Global 2000 there was discussion relating to impacts on the environment of increasing food production. It was argued that agricultural and grazing lands of parts of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could not be expected to retain their then present productivity with another two decades of intensifying pressures, with population growth making major loss of biological life support capacity virtually inevitable [10] . Global 2000 predicted that without major policy change, there would be a general worldwide deterioration of soils quality that would significantly interfere with achieving the production levels projected. There is no reliable worldwide estimate of the condition of soils thus it is not possible to assess Global 2000's predictions directly. Rozanov et al [15] , for example, estimate that the amount of lands whose soils have been severely damaged or rendered useless for agriculture exceeds the surface area that is currently cultivated. Their estimate, however, considers loses and degradation over the past 300 years and was made less than half way through the study period. Given the food production increases that were achieved during the study period together with the falling real price of food that has occurred over the same period,
Global 2000 was either unduly pessimistic about the environmental impacts of agriculture, or else those impacts were better managed and the effects of those impacts were less than expected.
Fishery projections
Global 2000 stated that naturally produced fish leveled off in the 1970s at about 70 million tonnes a year, 60 million tonnes from marine fisheries, and 10 million tonnes from freshwater fisheries, with no-further sustainable increase likely. In 1975, around 6 million tonnes of food was produced by aquaculture each year according to Global 2000, with Global 2000 indicating that there was significant scope for this to be expanded over the coming decades, citing the conclusion of a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference on aquaculture which stated that a 5-10 fold increase in production would be possible by the year 2000.
According to the FAO [16] approximately 86 million tonnes of fish were produced from marine fisheries, and around 9 million tonnes from fresh water fisheries in 2000. The total fisheries catch was around 95 million tonnes. Thirty-six million tonnes of food was also being produced by aquaculture in 2000. Based on this FAO data it would appear that Global 2000 was unduly pessimistic with regards to the world's potential fisheries, although relatively accurate with regards to aquaculture.
In The Resourceful Earth it was stated that marine fisheries would probably grow over the coming twenty years and reach 100-120 million tonnes a year of conventional species around the turn of the century. Aquaculture was not thought likely to increase its contribution to the world food supply very much by the year 2000, with other options for increasing natural fisheries likely to be able to produce food at lower cost. Given that the marine fish catch was around 86 million tonnes in 2000 and aquaculture produced around 36 million tonnes of food, it would seem that The Resourceful Earth was unduly optimistic with regards to marine fisheries and unduly pessimistic with regards to aquaculture.
One of the problems with the data of fish production produced by the FAO, the source of the data used by Global 2000 and The Resourceful Earth, and hence for present day comparisons, is that the FAO as an international organization must rely upon the data supplied to it by member countries, even when those data are of doubtful quality [17] . Watson and Pauly [17] note that global fish catches were widely expected to plateau in the 1990s at around 80 million tonnes and yet catches reported by the FAO continued to increase, largely driven by catch reports from China. Comparison of expected fish catches that were produced by modeling world fisheries with reported fish catches revealed significant differences in areas along the Chinese coast, with the large absolute value of these catches strongly affecting the global total. Watson and Pauly [17] believe that the reason for the over-reporting by China of its fisheries output is a result of having the same state entities which monitor the economy also being responsible for increasing its output, whereas in most countries under-reporting tends to be more of a problem. By substituting more realistic estimates of the Chinese fishing catch into the FAO statistics, a declining rather than increasing trend in fisheries catches since 1988 is revealed. According to Botsford et al [18] nearly half of world's individual fish stocks are fully exploited and a further 22 percent are over exploited. Therefore, given that world fisheries are in slight decline at present and there is significant over exploitation of some fish stocks, it appears that Global 2000 was nearer to reality than The Resourceful Earth in its analysis and predictions.
Furthermore, global totals fail to consider the quality of fisheries and whether or not more desirable species are being over fished, with desirable species over time being replaced in catches by less desirable species.
Forestry and Biodiversity Projections
In According to the FAO, the net global deforestation rate between 1990 and 2000 was only 9.4 million hectares [19] . The loss of natural forest in tropical areas was 15.2 million hectares and was compensated partly by the afforestation and the conversion of forests to plantations, as well as the natural expansion of forests, particularly in temperate areas. Furthermore, the FAO estimated that the total forest area of the world in 2000 was 3869 million hectares [19] . That this figure is much higher than the estimate given in Global 2000 twenty-two years earlier is due to different definitions of what constitutes a forest; a less stringent definition which results in a much larger percentage of the world's land area being forested logically should suggest that all things being equal, statistically speaking a higher deforestation rate will be recorded simply because there is more forest area potentially available for deforestation. The FAO's data, therefore, suggests that current deforestation rates are significantly lower than those predicted in
Global 2000. Global totals, however, say nothing about the biological health and diversity of the forested area.
In its discussion relating to deforestation, Global 2000 commented on a number of problems arising from deforestation, including the acceleration of runoff and erosion, siltation, loss of ecological diversity, micro-climate changes, and permanent loss of genetic resources [10] .
Between 437,000 and 1,875,000 species were predicted to be lost during the study period, depending upon the rate of deforestation and other factors, with this being as much as 20 percent of the three to ten million species thought to be present on Earth at that time [10] .
The Resourceful Earth presented a more optimistic analysis of the world's forests than was presented in Global 2000. Sedjo and Clawson [20] argued that there was little to suggest that major regions of the world would be denuded of their forests in any reasonable time horizon, although in some regions excessive deforestation was occurring. They saw serious environmental damage from forest utilization as a local rather than global problem since there was little danger of the wholesale destruction of the world's virgin tropical forests in the foreseeable future, with the risk of serious loss of genetic resources being exaggerated.
Estimating the actual loss of genetic resources over period of 1980 to 2000 is very difficult due to the level of uncertainty regarding number of species and their extinction rates. Habitat loss in some of the world's most biologically rich areas suggests that extinction rates must be high, and extinction rates have been made for a few intensively studies species groups such as mammals.
However, extrapolating from one group, such as mammals relies upon these rates being representative of completely different taxa [21] . Hence with the paucity of reliable data few global estimates of species loss based upon methodologically sound research are available.
Estimates of both background (natural) extinction rates and current extinction rates remain highly uncertain [21] . Estimates also vary due to uncertainty about the total number of species present on Earth, together with uncertainty about the precise distribution of those species.
Hughes et al [22] state that assuming that there are 14 million species globally and that twothirds of all species exist in tropical forests, then between 14,000 and 40,000 species are being lost each year. While this estimate is comparable to the figures stated in Global 2000, in reality it suggests a much lower rate than that given in Global 2000 because this current estimate depends upon a much greater estimate of the total number of species and hence the total percentage of species lost is much lower. Woodruff [23] estimates that at least 250,000 species went extinct in the twentieth century, an estimate that is between 13 and 57 percent of that given in Global 2000 for just the last twenty years of the twentieth century. Given the high level of uncertainty about the total number of species present in the world and current rates of species loss, it is impossible to know with any certainty how accurate Global 2000's estimate of loss of genetic diversity actually was, even if the estimates given above suggest that that of Global 2000 was unduly high.
The Resourceful Earth noted in its discussion on species loss that estimates of previous or then current extinction rates, which were little more than guesses anyway, were very low (up to 100 species per year) and yet Global 2000 suggested that this rate would suddenly increase to around 40,000 species per year [24] . Simon and Wildavsky [24] argued that such a sudden deviation from the past should not normally be taken except on very strong empirical evidence and yet this evidence was lacking.
Regardless of the exact rate of extinctions there is little doubt that the world is in the midst of a major extinction interval that is not sustainable since it is well above background extinction rates [21] although probably not unprecedented in the Earth's history [23] . On a different note, Nee and May [25] argue that even when 95 percent of species are lost, approximately 80 percent of evolutionary history is preserved, with the proportion of evolutionary history surviving being relatively insensitive to whether the saved species are chosen randomly or optimally. They note, however, that conservation concerns relate not just to the preservation of evolutionary history but also to other factors such as ecosystem functioning or the potential usefulness of lost species, hence this does not necessarily significantly diminish concern relating to species loss.
Water Projections
Global Feitelson and Chenoweth [28] propose an index which measures the adequacy of a nation's water resources using economic terms since this allows the internalization of both intergenerational and intra-generational issues in a defensible manner. The index they propose is based upon cost of a supplying a sufficient volume (for domestic and industrial needs) of clean sustainable water and sanitation to all the people of a country at all times compared to the nation's gross national product. Feitelson and Chenoweth [28] [10] . In reality, the total world primary energy output in 1999 was 401 Zettajoules 10 [30] .
Global 2000 expressed a high degree of certainty that an increase in energy prices was to be expected. Therefore, a real price increase of five percent per annum was adopted as In The Resourceful Earth the discussion focused on the way global energy markets operate, and the effects of prices. It was noted, for example, that it is impossible for the world to "run out of oil" as demand outstrips supply since the consumption of oil must always equal supply, with the balance being achieved by prices [32] . Singer [32] argued that the oil price rises around 1980 would lead to a decline in oil consumption in the OECD if all economic replacements to oil were put into effect. While oil consumption did rise during the study period, it rose much more slowly than previous trends indicated it would, thus suggesting that the oil price rises of 1973 and 1980 did indeed hinder the growth in oil consumption.
Atmospheric problems
Atmospheric problems such as global warming or the depletion of the ozone layer were not the issues of global prominence at the time Global 2000 or The Resourceful Earth were written that they later on went on to become. As with many environmental issues, the agenda has changed over time as new problems are identified and then research is conducted to investigate that nature of these problems and their seriousness. Simultaneously, other once prominent issues will fade from the agenda as solutions are found and implemented or the problem was found to be less serious than initially suspected. In the late 1970s and early 1980s knowledge about global warming or depletion of the ozone layer was very limited compared to today. For example, Global 2000 contained three climatological scenarios, namely no change, global warming, and global cooling, each of which was considered to be of equal probability [10] .
Global 2000 did not predict, however, that any substantial climate change would occur before the year 2000 [10] . C [34] . Nineteen-ninety-eight was the warmest year in the instrumental record since 1861.
Global 2000 also remarked upon the depletion of the ozone layer, noting that there are a number of anthropocentric causes of ozone depletion, even if the relative magnitude of the different anthropocentric causes was uncertain at the time [10] . While the date at which significant ozone depletion could take was unknown, it was thought that at the 1974 rate of the use of chlorofluoromethanes, global ozone would be reduced by 14 percent over fifty years [10] .
The Resourceful Earth said relatively little about the depletion of the ozone layer. Landsberg [33] stated that with the stratospheric ozone reduction expected no appreciable alteration of climate at the earth's surface was expected while assessing the medical problems due to increased risk of skin cancer went beyond the scope of his study.
According to the United Nations Environment Program [35] , current ozone losses are at six percent in northern mid-latitudes in winter and spring, and five percent in southern midlatitudes all year around. Ozone losses are 50 percent in the Antarctic spring, and 15 percent in the Arctic spring. Due to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol there has been a marked decrease in the consumption of ozone depleting substances and recovery in the ozone layer is expected to begin shortly [35] . While Global 2000 ozone depletion predictions for mid-latitudes appear reasonable with hindsight, the depletion seen over Antarctica and the Arctic was unexpected.
Both climate change and ozone depletion were seen as problems relating to the global commons, thus making them both important but difficult problems to solve. While it appears that the problem of ozone layer depletion has been reasonably successfully dealt with (on a long term basis at least) during the study period, the build up of carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere has yet to be adequately addressed even though Global 2000 described them both as atmospheric problems of great consequence over the long term. Other atmospheric problems, such as the emission of sulfur and nitrogen oxides leading to acid rain, were mentioned in Global 2000 but were seen primarily as regional rather than global atmospheric problems [10] .
Discussion and Conclusions
In Resourceful Earth, either separately or together, could have had a major impact on the many of problems described. This is due to the fact that they were global problems whose management depended upon the actions of thousand, millions or in some cases billions of people worldwide.
For example, it would be difficult to argue that global food production increased as dramatically had been constant or declining for many years argued that, despite such trends, in the coming two decades real prices were likely to rise due to increasing energy costs, declining ore grades, and increased requirements for environmental protection [10] . As predicted by The Resourceful Earth, however, mineral price declines continued. (See Table 5 . suggests that in most cases humanity will manage to deal adequately with the more pressing of these problems. 13 As such, this review of a major predictive neo-Malthusians report and the associated Cornucopian report together with the actual data for the period in question suggests that Cornucopian report has better stood the test of time.
Cornucopian and neo-Malthusian perspectives are two polar views on the state of the global environment. The main difference between these two perspectives lies in their attitude towards 12 In the case of the former USSR this decline can be attributed to economic and social breakdown, and thus paradoxically may support Simon's [8] view that human ingenuity (and the ability of society to tap that ingenuity) rather than absolute numbers is what is most important.
adaptive capacity although adaptive capacity is exogenous to them both. Adaptive capacity, as defined by Ohlsson [36] consists of a structural component that includes both institutional and intellectual capital for the generation of alternative solutions by technocratic elites, and a social component that consists of the willingness and ability of society to accept such solutions as being both reasonable and legitimate. Both components may be found amongst local populations although this is sometimes overlooked when making predictions about the future.
Neither for example, were based upon the assumption that there would be no significant change in national policies regarding natural resources management and the environment over the study period [10] , and many of the predictions in the report indicate that no allowance was made for the ability of individuals or nations to react to changing prices or technological developments by adapting production techniques or consumption patterns. Conversely, in The Resourceful Earth Simon and Kahn [9] argued that human adaptation to changes in the supply of natural resources was incorporated into the long run trends of supply and cost themselves and thus extrapolating these trends in the future assumed that such adaptation would continue.
Empirically it can be seen that there is great variation in adaptive capacity between countries and regions, and over time. Thus, the real question for the forward-looking environmental discourse may not be the cornucopian -neo-Malthusian debate in terms of resource use or the extent of human impacts on the environment, but rather, assessing how global human society adapts to environmental (and other) challenges together with understanding what adaptation mechanisms are adopted and why.
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